Manner of determination of commencement and termination of time :

Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 lays down the provision relating to commencement and termination of time. It stipulates that in any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word from, and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word to.

In simple words, while computing time, the rule is to exclude the first day and to include the last day. Courts have held that the word “from” is akin to “after” and that the word “from” if used for the purpose of and in reference to the computation of time, as for example, from a stated date, that stated date is prima facie excluded from computation. Although on some occasions, Courts have a taken a view that the question as to whether the stated date should or should not be so excluded, should be decided according to the context in which the word “from” occurs.

It is worthwhile to mention here that the Supreme Court, in case of M/s. Econ Antri Ltd v. M/s. Rom Industries Ltd. & Anr, had also taken a similar view on this point and decided that while computing the period of limitation, the day on which the offence is committed/ date of cause of action has to be excluded.

Another point which needs a mention here is that section 3(35) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 defines the expression “month” to mean a month reckoned according to the British calendar. Further, Allahabad High Court in case of CCus & CEx. v. Ashok Kumar Tiwari 2015 (37) STR 727 (All.) has held that where the legislature has stipulated the period of limitation in terms of months, such a stipulation can only mean a calendar month and not 30 days.