Even the wider language of Section 20 of the Kerala Rent Control Act does not enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. We are in full agreement with the view of the 3-Judge Bench in Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana and others; [(1993) 1 SCC 499] that the word “propriety” does not confer power upon the High Court to re-appreciate evidence to come to a different conclusion but its consideration of evidence is confined to find out legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. We approve the view of this Court in Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana and others; [(1993) 1 SCC 499]. The observation in Dr. D. Sankaranarayanan v. Punjab National Bank; [1995 Supp. (4) SCC 675] that the revisional Court under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act cannot reverse the findings of the first appellate Court upon a reassessment of evidence is in line with Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana and others; [(1993) 1 SCC 499] and we approve the same. Similarly, the view in Ubaiba v. Damodaran; [(1999) 5 SCC 645] , which has followed Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana and others; [(1993) 1 SCC 499] that, under Section 20 of the Kerala Rent Control Act, the revisional court will not be entitled to re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion in place of the conclusion of the Appellate Authority is the correct view and gets our nod. In T. Sivasubramaniam and Ors. v. Kasinath Pujari and Ors.; [(1999) 7 SCC 275] this Court has held that under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act, the High Court does not enjoy an appellate power to reappraise or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding contrary to the finding recorded by the courts below. This view is the correct view and we approve the same. The observation in Ramdoss that the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction cannot act as an appellate court/authority and it is impermissible for the High Court to reassess the evidence in a revision petition filed under Section 25 of the Act is in accord with Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana and others; [(1993) 1 SCC 499] and Dr. D. Sankaranarayanan v. Punjab National Bank; [1995 Supp. (4) SCC 675] . Its observation that the High Court can interfere with incorrect finding of fact must be understood in the context where such finding is perverse, based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or such finding has been arrived at by ignoring or overlooking the material evidence or such finding is so grossly erroneous that if allowed to stand, will occasion in miscarriage of justice. Ramdoss17 does not hold that the High Court may interfere with the findings of fact because on re-appreciation of the evidence its view is different from that of the first Appellate Court or Authority. The decision of this Court in V.M. Mohan v. Prabha Rajan Dwarka and Ors.; [(2006) 9 SCC 606] is again in line with the judgment of this Court in Rukmini. We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent Control Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court/First Appellate Authority because on re-appreciation of the evidence, its view is different from the Court/Authority below. The consideration or examination of the evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under these Acts is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the Court/Authority below is according to law and does not suffer from any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by Court/Authority below, if perverse or has been arrived at without consideration of the material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to correction because it is not treated as a finding according to law. In that event, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the above Rent Control Acts shall be entitled to set aside the impugned order as being not legal or proper. The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself the correctness or legality or propriety of any decision or order impugned before it as indicated above. However, to satisfy itself to the regularity, correctness, legality or propriety of the impugned decision or the order, the High Court shall not exercise its power as an appellate power to re-appreciate or re-assess the evidence for coming to a different finding on facts. Revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power of reconsideration of all questions of fact as a court of first appeal. Where the High Court is required to be satisfied that the decision is according to law, it may examine whether the order impugned before it suffers from procedural illegality or irregularity. We, thus, approve the view of this Court in Rukmini as noted by us. The decision of this Court in Ram Dass2must be read as explained above. The reference is answered accordingly. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Vs. Dilbahar Singh (Supreme Court), Civil Appeal No.6177 Of 2004, Date- August 27, 2014